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THE BLACK SURROGATE MOTHER
Anita L. Allen*

I

n earlier essays, I considered two aspects of the practice of surrogate
parenting. 1 In the first article, I examined the Baby M case and argued
in favor of an inalienable constitutional right of the surrogate mother to
a post-natal opportunity to change her mind about relinquishing parental
rights.2 The second essay, considered-and rejected-the "slavery equa
tion argument" against surrogate motherhood.3 This third article con
templates another facet of surrogacy-gestational surrogacy.4 I will
comment on johnson v. Calvert, 5 a case involving a Black surrogate
mother, and on whether gestational surrogacy by Black women simply
puts a new face on an old problem: whites owning Black women's
wombs.6
The American slave experience, while not equivalent to surrogacy,
can help illuminate why many people find the practice of commercial
surrogacy disturbing. Before the American Civil War, virtually all south*Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. B.A., New College, 1974; M.A., University of Michigan,
1976; Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1979; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984.
1. "Surrogate parenting" can be described as a practice by which a woman ("surrogate
mother") bears a child for another woman, man or couple. As the major legal cases
of the past decade have noted, before conception and for a fee, a surrogate mother
agrees to be artificially inseminated and later to terminate parental rights and
surrender custody of the resulting child.
2. See Anita Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759 (1988)
[hereinafter Privacy, Surrogacy] (rejecting privacy case for specific enforcement of
surrogacy agreements and defending plausibility of inalienable constitutional right
to post-natal opportunity to change mind about relinquishing parental rights).
3. See Anita Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y
139 (Winter 1990) [hereinafter Surrogacy, Slavery] (rejecting argument that slavery
and surrogacy are morally equivalent on the ground that the equation ignores the
virtually total control of the slave owner over the slave that is absent from surrogacy
arrangements).
4. Gestational surrogacy is a process whereby a preembryo is created from the egg of
a woman and the gametes of a man (spouse or donor) thorough in vitro fertilization.
The preembryo is implanted into the uterus of a second woman who becomes
pregnant and carries the child to term. As will be discussed later, this practice has
currently been used only in cases where the woman who supplied the egg was
medically unable to become pregnant. There are, however, no rules that require a
preexisting medical condition before making use of a gestational surrogate.
5. Reporter's Transcript, Johnson v. Calvert (No. X 63 31 90 consolidated with AD
57638) (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Transcript]. No opinion has been
published in the case.
6. Alice Walker, What Can the White Man . . . Say to the Black Woman, 248(20) THE
NATION 691 (1989) (noted Black noveUst depicting current reproductive policy as
continuation of white male ownership and control of Black women).
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new wave of concern that surrogate
motherhood turns women into "commercial slaves 24 hours a day for
270 days."12 The Johnson case highlights a troubling truth underlying
the rhetoric that contemporary surrogacy is slavery. Affluent white
women's infertility, sterility, preferences and power threaten to tum
poor Black women, already understood to be a servant class,13 into a

Johnson v.

"surrogate class."
There are risks inherent in surrogacy arrangements. These risks
centrally include the emotional devastation experienced by surrogates
who are compelled to give up the children that they have agreed to bear
for others. Parental rights deemed inalienable prior to childbirth could
perhaps reduce the emotional risk of commercial surrogacy to white
genetic and gestational surrogates.14 But in light of widespread preju
dice, racism and racial segregation, such a right would be of doubtful

7. In some aspects, American slavery was analogous to a de facto system of surrogacy.
Slave owners were recognized not only as the owners of the slaves but they were
so owners of the nat:ural children to which the slaves gave birth. These ownership
n�hts allowed the children to be bought or sold to third parties, regardless of the
w1shes of the natural mother. See infra note 9. Cf. Walker, supra note 6.
8 . 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'v 139 (Winter 1990}.
9. Lucy Delaney, Struggle� for Freedom, in Srx WOMEN's SLAVE NARRATTVES 9 (1988)
(woman held wrongly m slavery later sues for her own release and "the right to
own her own child"}.
10. �n re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, mld
m part, remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). See generally
PHYLLIS CHESLER,
SAcREo BoND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M. (1988}.
11. Transcript, supra note 5.
12. Jeremy Rifkin & Andrew Kimbrell, Put A Stop To Surrogate Parenting Now USA
'
Today, .Aug. 20, 1990, § A, at 8 (final ed.}.
13.
cc?r�mg to figures published by the U. S . Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
.
tatistics, m 1989, a typical, recent year:

�
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practical value to Black gestators who bear white children. Under John
the chances of the Black woman successfully gaining custody of the
child she bears appear to be slim. Indeed, P olly had a better chance.
Without a per se ban on commercial surrogacy, it is not clear that poor
and Black women can be protected from the risks of surrogacy arrange
son,

rnents.15
I. ANNA HAD A BABY
On September 19, 1990, in Orange C ounty, California, a twenty
ni ne-year-old Black woman named Anna L. Johnson gave birth to a six
pound, ten- ounce baby boy.16 A casual observer visiting the maternity
ward at St. Joseph' s Hospital would have found nothing unusual in the
sight of Anna Johnson breastfeeding the tiny newborn. However, as
the journalists who swarmed into the hospital to report the birth knew,
Johnson and the infant she delivered had an unusual relationship. They
were not genetically related. They were not even of the same race. For
the first time in history, an Afr ican-American woman had given birth to
a child exclusively of European and Philippine ancestry.17
Anna Johnson's pregnancy was the result of in vitro fertilization and
preembryo transplart-.18 P hysicians had surgically implanted into John
son's uterus a preembryo formed in vitro from donated gametes. Al
ready the single mother of a preschool-aged daughter named Erica,
Johnson underwent the procedure as a service to Mark and Crispina
C alvert.19 Mark Calvert was a thirty-four-year-old insurance adjuster2°
and Crispina Calvert, who had lost her u terus to cancer, was a thirty
six-year-old registered nurse.21 C rispina C alvert worked at the hospital
where Anna Johnson worked as a licensed vocational nurse. 22 The
C alv erts promised to pay Johnson $10,000 for her trouble.23
15. At least 11 states have banned surrogate parenting. See Rifkin & Kimbrell, supra
16.

note 12.
Custody Battle Begins Over Surrogate's Baby, L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1990, § A, at 1,
col. 3 (Orange Cty ed., Metro Desk) [hereinafter Custody Battle].
.

17. This is the ftrst case in which a surrogate mother without genetic links to the child

sought custody of the child. See Martin Kasindorf, Birth Mother is True Parent, Doctor
nna
Testifies, Newsday, Oct. 10, 1990, at 15 (News) [herein�fter Birth !'vfolher].

�

Johnson, described in the media as Black or as an Afncan-Amencan, descnbed
herself at the evidentiary hearing in the case as "half�white. . See Martin Kasindorf,
.
Overwhelming Maternal Instincts; Surrogate Mom Explams De�zsron, Newsday, Oct. 11,
1990, at 15 (News) [hereinafter Overwhelming Maternal lnstmcts]. M�rk Calvert, the
father, was described as Caucasian. Crispina Calvert, the genetic mother, was
described in news reports both as a "Filipina" and as of "mixed Asian ancestry."
See Charles Bremner, Surrogate Mother Loses Claim to Baby, The Times, Oct. 23, 1990,
"

18.

at 11, col. 4 (Overseas).
.
.
See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, 46(3) Ethzcal Co�szderatzo�s
of the New Reproductive Technologies 585 (supp. 1, 1986) [hereinafter Ethzcal Considerations).
.
.

19. �me women who are not parties to surrogacy cor:'tracts un�ergo these exp�nslve,

tJ:t

20.
21.
22.
23.

elf own.
time-consuming procedures hoping to deliver a child they will parent as
A w oman whose ovaries have been surgically removed or whose fallop1� tubes
are obstructed, for example, may undergo these procedures. See generally zd.
See Kasind orf, Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17.
ld. See also Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17.
ld.
/d.
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surrogate mothers had been known to change their minds before,25 but
this was the first publicized instance in which a "surrogate carrier, ges
tator, womb mother, or placental mother"26 had done so.
Johnson filed a lawsuit on August 13, 1990, when she was seven
and a half months pregnant. Alleging that the Calverts had neglected
her during the pregnancy and failed to make payments, and that she
had developed a bond with the unborn child, Johnson sued for parental
rights and child custody. 27
The Calverts answered that the baby was theirs alone: "He looks like
an oriental baby with my husband's nose," Crispina Calvert said.28
Although Johnson was willing to accept a court-ordered joint-custody
arrangement, the Calverts were not. They announced to the news media
that they would rather see the baby they would name "Christopher" in
a foster home than to share parenting with their hand-picked gestator.29
Johnson's lawyer, Richard C. Gilbert, countered that he could not com
prehend the CaJverts' belief that it would be "in the baby's best interest
to be taken from the breasts of its birth mother. "30
In September 1990, Orange County Superior Court Judge Richard
N. Parslow, Jr. awarded temporary custody to the Calverts and granted
Johnson visitation rights.31 In an October hearing, the court heard legal
argument and expert testimony on ·the question of permanent custody.
Some expert testimony favored the Calverts . However, medical and
psychological experts testified on behalf of Anna Johnson's claim to be
the "tru� " mother.32 Johnson also had other authority on her side. A
_
Califorrua statute expressly provided that birth mothers are the natural
and legal parents of their offspring.33 In addition, a 1989 Supreme Court
24. The first reported childbirth by a surrogate gestational mother occurred in April
1986 in Oeveland,
hio. The genetic mother, like Crispina Calvert, had had a
hysterectomy. Phys1aans
at the Mt. Sinai Clinic created a preembryo in vitro, using
an egg harvested from the genetic mot'her's ovaries and her husband's sperm. The
preembryo was implanted into the uterus of a second woman. The second woman,
like �na Johnson, became pregnant and carried the child to term. See Ethet1
i l
Considerations, supra note 18, at 58S.
25. �n re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part, rerld
m part, remanded, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2 d 1227 (1988).
26. See Ethical Considerations, supra note 18 a t SBS.
27. See Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17.
28. Custody Battle, supra note 16.
29. Id.

�

30. ld.

31. Se� Who'� Mommy? Without a Law lts Hard to Know, Newsda
y, Sept. 24, 1990, at 48
(VIe� pomts) (Nassau and Suffolk ed.). See also Genetic
Parents
Given Sole Custody
_
of Child, L.A. T1mes,
Oct. 23, 1990, § A, at 1, col. 2 (Metro) [hereinafter Genetic
Parents].

32. Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17.
33. CALIF. CIVIL CooE § 7003 (1983) reads in
part:
§ 7003. Method of establishment
The parent and child relationship may be
established as follows:

�...................................
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case had denied parental rights t o a sperm donor claiming only a genetic
link to a child.34
A nna Johnson testified at the October hearing that she did not ini
tially plan to keep the child.35 Johnson said that she first changed her
mind when Mark Calvert refused to take her to the hospital . She was
forced to take a cab for what proved to be false labor pains. While
Johnson was a patient, Crispina Calvert, who worked in the same hos
pital, refused to visit. Even after she began to want the child, Johnson
said that she was "in a state of denial" and she kept "trying to tell myself
that I am not supposed to have any emotion toward my child, but there
is no way that you can prevent those emotions from taking over, and
those instincts came out naturally."36 Describing her state of mind at
the time as confused, anxious and desperate, Johnson admitted sending
the Calverts a letter on July 23, 1990, threatening to withhold the baby
unless they paid her $5,000 immediately. She also acknowledged that
the Cal verts had sent her two periodic payments early. 37
A fter her testimony, Johnson told reporters she was confident of
obtaining at least joint custody and visitation rights: "I know he's there
. . . I know he won't forget me."38 However, on October 22, 1990, Judge
Parslow ruled that Anna Johnson had no parental rights whatsoever in
the child she bore.�
By way of consolation, the judge offered that
C rispina Calvert might elect to provide Anna Johnson with "a picture
now and then, a note as to how this child is doing in life."40

II.

ANNA'S "MISTAKES AN D WEAKN ESSES"

A.

She Could N o t Win

Public reaction to the final decision in the Johnson case was rnixed.41
It is unclear that the outcome of Anna Johnson's case was a bad outcome
on the merits. There was too little information in the court transcript
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be established by proof
of her giving birth to the child, or under this part . .. .
See also CALIF. CrVIL CooE § 7001 (1983):
§ 7001. Parent and child relationship; defined
As used in this part, "parent and child relationship" means the legal
relationship between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to
which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.
It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relation
ship.
34. Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
35. Kasindorf, Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17.
36. ld.

37. ld. But see Chesler, supra note 10, at 5-7. In the transcript of a tape recorded
conversa tion between Mary Beth Whitehead Gould and William Stem, Gould
threatened to kill herself and Baby M. Nonetheless, she was eventually awarded
parental rights.
38. Kasindorf, Birth Mother, supra note 17.
39. See Genetic Parents, supra note 31. Judge Parslow terminated the temporary custody
and visitation order he had imposed in September. Id.
40. See Transcript, supra note 5, at 20.
. . .
41. Sonni Efron & Kevin Johnson, Decision Hailed as Proper, Cnticized as Outrageous, �.A.
Times, Oct.23, 1990, §A, at 1, col. 5 (Orange Cty ed., Metro Desk): See also Votces,
L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, §A, at 12, col. 1 (Orange Cty ed., Fore1gn).

-
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and in newspaper accounts to meaningf�y assess the r�lative strengths
of the parties and various alternate child custody options. However,
one can argue that presiding Judge Parslow's attempt to rationalize his
decision fell short.
Judge Parslow delivered a thirty-five-minute oral statement from the
bench42 to a packed courtroom.43 He did not � nnoun�e his decision right
away, nor did he need to. Judge Parslow s operung remar� made
obvious his ultimate ruling. He declared that the case before him was
"not an adoption relinquishment case, .. . not a baby selling case, . ..
not a Baby M type case where we had natural parents on tw� sides of a
situation competing."44 To say that the johnson case was unlike Baby M
was already to conclude that a surrogate gestator who received a donated
preembryo is not a "natural" mother on par with a surrogate gestator
who supplies her own ovum. Yet any gestator's relationship to the child
she delivers is undeniably biological; in that sense it is also "natural. "
As soon as Johnson's suit became public, legal policy analysts dis
cussed johnson v. Calvert as the next chapter in the history of a repro
ductive revolution of which Baby M was but a dramatic early scene.45
Many observers viewed the cases as closely analogous. In both cases
women became pregnant for a cash payment of $10,000 and a desire to
help a childless married couple have a child of their own. In both cases
the surrogate said she had developed a bond during pregnancy that
made it difficult to part with the newborn as agreed. In both cases the
contract to exchange reproductive services for cash raised concerns about
gender inequality and "baby selling . " In both cases the presumption
that a woman who gives birth to a child is its legal mother seemed to
implicate adoption policies. Yet, contrary to these views, Judge Parslow
tried to rapidly distinguish the case before him from Baby M. Judge
Par�low's sense of the case was that neither adoption laws, proscriptions
agamst commercial trafficking in human beings, gender inequality, nor
the developing law of genetic surrogate motherhood was relevant to his
decision.46
Judge Parslow asserted in his opening statement that awarding the
.
child to two mothers--three parents--was not in the boy's emotional
best interest.47 Therefore, he would award only one of the two female
.
pa�ties c�stody over the child. Once the judge refused to view the case
as mvolvmg a surrogate mo�her or adoption agreement, his rejection of
,
a , three parent/tw? �other model could have meant only one thing:
�e would select Cnspma Calvert, not Anna Johnson as the child's sole,
nghtful mother. Theoreti�ally, Judge Parslow might have rejected both
Johnson and the Calverts m favor of a neutral third-party caregiver, such
as a foster mother. But Judge Parslow ruled out third-party alternatives .
42. No formal opinion was issued in johnson v. Calvert
at the time of the ruling agai nst
�nna Johnson. The cour: report r's ?fficiaJ transcri
pt memorialized the judge 's, at
�
3 times, a �kward explanation of hts difficu
lt decision. See Transcript, supra note 5.
4 . 5 ee G enetrc Parents, supra note 31.
44. Transcript, supra note 5, at 3.
45-5ee CaFt.
r,o rnra
· 5 urrogacy Case Rmses New Questions
About Parenthood' Christian Science
.
Morutor, Sept. 25, 1990 at 1 col . 1
(U.S. ).
46. Transcript, supra note S, at 3�
47. ld.
·

·

·
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He understood his role as Solomonic: unable to divide the baby in half,
the judge would choose between the genetic and gestational mothers.48
The race issue, Anna Johnson's race, also made Judge Parslow's
ultimat e decision predictable.49 Throughout history, Black women and
mulatto women have been hired or enslaved to play a number of im
portant de facto "mothering" roles in American families.50 Moreover,
Black women who marry white men have sometimes wound up "moth
ering" white step-children. However, I suspect that few regard Black
women as the appropriate legal mothers of children who are not at least
part Black. Blacks are not supposed to have white children. Blacks are
not s upposed to want to have white children of their own-not in the
adoption context51 and not, therefore, in the surrogacy context.
For better or for worse, race is a factor in adoption, and it will also
be a factor in surrogate gestation. Against this background, it was
unimaginable that Anna Johnson would win custody of the child she
bore from the Calverts' genetic material. Arguably, a lawsuit against
the Calverts brought by a white or Asian surrogate gestator would have
the same outcome. A judge deciding such a case would foresee the
possibility that a Black or brown or yellow gestator might someday wind
up with a white couple's genetic child unless it set a firm precedent
favoring genetic parents.
B.

Rationalizing Her Loss

Judge Parslow very briefly recited the facts of the case as followsY
The parties met and discussed a gestation arrangement in the winter of
1989-90. They entered into a formal agreement on January 15, 1990.
Against the scientific odds, a successful preembryo transplant took place
just four days later on January 19, 1990. Johnson agreed orally and in
writing to "relinquish the child to the Calvert's and make no claim for
parental rights. "5 3
The court had little to say about Anna Johnson's pregnancy. Judge
Parslow spoke of Johnson's role in the passive voice: "a baby boy was
delivered from Anna Johnson on September 19, 1990."54 Test results
48. /d.
49. The Calverts' attorney raised the issue of race in what one reporter described as

an "emotional" courtroom, asking Johnson whether she had ever told anyone s�e
had always wanted a white baby . Johnson said no, "considering I'm half-whtte
myself." See Kasindorf Overwhelming Maternal Instincts, supra note 17.
50. Set Walker, supra note
.
51. Official bans on transracial adoptions have been held uncons�tutional. See� e.g.,
(mval
�ompos v. McKeithen, 341 F.Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (three�Jud9e court)
Equal
the
of
lation
vt
a
tdating Louisiana statute prohibiting interracial adop�on as
�
Protection Clause). However, while whites are sometimes pe �rrutted to adopt Black
or bi-racial children, it is virtually unheard of for an adoption agency .to offer a
healthy, able-bodied white child to Black parents for adoption. Cf. Patnoa Ballard,
Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma, 17 J. FAM. LAW 333 (1978-7?); .su.san
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color, 17 BuFFALO L. REv. 303 (1�68); Shan 0 Bnen,
Race in Adoption Proceedings, 21 TULSA L.J. 485 (1986). Cf. Richard Posner, The
.
Re gulatzon
of tile Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.L. REv. 59 (1987).
52. Transcript, supra note
5 at 3-4.
53. /d.
54. /d. at 4.

6.

•
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"showed that Anna has no genetic relationship to the child, and that
there is a 99.999% probability that the Calverts are the genetic parents
of the child."55 On the basis of the genetic tests, the judge found "beyond
a reasonable doubt that Crispina Calvert is the genetic, biological and
natural mother ... and that Mark Calvert is the genetic, biological and
natural father of the child."56 If future courts follow Judge Parslow,
genes alone will establish natural and biological motherhood.
Judge Parslow resorted to two analogies which are indicative of how
courts may come to characterize the unique role of the surrogate gestator.
He analogized Johnson to a "foster parent providing care, protection
and nurture during the period of time that the natural mother, Crispina
Calvert, was unable to care for the child. "57 Judge Parslow admitted
that "there is [sic] a lot of differences" between a gestator and fo ster
parent, but concluded that "there is [sic] a lot of similarities."58
His second analogy compared surrogate gestators to "wet-nurses."59
As recently as the last century it was common for affluent European and
American families to pay women to breast-feed and tend their infants
and small children. Judge Parslow thought it was plain enough that
wet-nurses lack parental rights: "I'm not sure anyone would argue th at
the person that nursed the child . . .from seven pounds to thirty pounds
got parental rights and became the mother. "1:!0 In the judge's view,
surrogate gestators are just as plainly without parental rights. One
might have expected the court to resist an analogy to the medically and
socially discredited practice of wet-nursing. If surrogate gest a tion is like
wet-nursing, perhaps it, too, should be relegated to history.
To counter the impression that he endorsed the use of surrogacy by
women who are neither infertile nor sterile, Judge Parslow underscored

the Calverts' medical need. "This is not a vanity situation, somebody
looking to avoid stretch marks," he said.6t For medical reasons, Crispina
Calvert "has no place to carry the child. "62 The question of vanity versus
�edical need may be a different, deeper matter for the courts to consider
It is for "medical" reasons that couples often cannot
m the future.
reproduce on their own. But, it was not for medical reasons alone that
Crispina Calvert possessed a preembryo in need of a gestator. It wa s
also for psychological and social reasons. Crispina Calvert wanted a
_
child
and she valued genetic parentage over other options such as adop
_
tion. It was not for medical reasons alone that researchers learne d to
create preembryos in petri dishes and test tubes. It was also for the
sake of satisfying the public preference for genetic parentage. 63 What
_ whether
cou�ts must con�ont IS
satisfaction of the strong desire to have
one s own genetically-related children is worth the social price of sur
rogacy arrangements.
These rationales raise serious questions. Why
does a person w ho is
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

/d.
/d. at 4-5.
/d. at 5.
/d. at 6.
ld. at 17.
ld.
/d. at 6.
/d.
See California Surrogacy Case R atses
·
New Questions About Parentho,od supra note 45.
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like a foster mother or a wet-nurse have no parental rights? Why does
a surrogate gestator have no parental rights against those who seek out
her services for "medical" reasons? To answer these questions Judge
Parslow focussed on what gestators and genetic parents provide their
offspring. The genes we get from our genetic parents determine "who
we are, what we become."64 By comparison to what we get through
our genes, we get little in the uterine environment, not even a clear-cut
reciprocal bond with our gestators.65 The limited comparative impact of
the gestator on the child's future self, and Judge Parslow's doubt of the
reality of a mother-child bond during pregnancy, were the core of a
larger set of arguments he offered against parental rights for gestators.
Writing about the B,aby M case, I stressed the importance of the
genetic ties that Mary Beth Whitehead Gould had to her child .66 I argued
that the parity of the surrogate's genetic ties with the biological father's
was one reason to accord her equal parental rights.67 But to say that
genetic heritage is a factor to consider in surrogate mother cases involv
ing disputes between genetic parents, is not to say that in a battle
between genetic and gestational parents, genetic parents should always
win out. Like the knowledge of genetic linkage, the experiences of
pregnancy and childbirth can also have an important role in shaping
women's sense of their identities and responsibilities.
Introducing additional concerns, Judge Parslow argued that both the
emotional well-being of the child and policies against custody disputes
or extortion militate against awarding parental rights to a "gestational
carrier." Interestingly, the judge did not mention the race issue in his
decision on the case. The closest he came was to allude to the potential
"identity problems" a child raised by two mothers might have. Racial
identity is one kind of identity individuals in our society normally de
velop, along with their gender, ethnic, religious, regional and other
forms of identity. Also weighing against the gestator, in Judge Parslow's
view, is the desirability of a judicial policy favoring "surrogacy contracts
in the in vitro fertilization cases. "68 There is, he said, "a tremendous
demand longing [sic] out there for genetic children of people that are
not able to have children."69 Surrogacy contracts are neither "void nor
against public policy," ruled Judge Parslow, and are "enforceable by . . .
specific performance, [or] arguably even by habeas corpus, if neces
sary."70 This is precisely contrary to the ruling of New Jersey Supreme
Court Chief Judge Wilenz in the Baby M case, who held that surrogacy
contracts are void, against public policy and not specifically enforcea
ble.71
C.

Finding Fault

The main thrust of Judge Parslow's argument for enforcement of the
surrogacy contract was that opportunistic, dishonest Anna Johnson had
64.

65.

Transcript, supra note 5, at 8.

ld.

66. See Allen, Privacy , Surrogacy, supra
67. ld. at 1764.

68. Transcript, supra note 5, at 11.
69. ld.
70. ld.
71. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).

note 2, at 1790.
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doubted the sincerity of
signed the contract voluntarily. The judge
was hers and that she
Johnson's statements that she believed the child
's
had bonded with the child. He intimated that Anna Johnson lawsuit
was opportunistic since such statements were fir_st made shortly before
the lawsuit was filed.72 Yet, Johnson cannot fauly be blamed for the
timing of her action. It would have been in the later stages of pregnancy
that she would have been likely to experience the keenest maternal
feelings. Bringing a lawsuit promptly at that point to clarify her legal
rights and duties was a responsible course.
Judge Parslow also intimated that Anna Johnson was dishonest. He
said she omitted unspecified facts about the difficulty of her first preg
nancy and misrepresented her feelings and intentions in this case.73 As
for the contract itself, Judge Parslow conduded that Anna Johnson knew
what she was doing. Johnson was "29 years old, educated, a licensed
professional, .. . [who had spent two or three years] in the marine
corp[s]."74 She "sounded ... articulate and intelligent.""'S Judge Parslow
said he couldn't "remember having seen a cooler witness testifying in
court."76 His words hinted that Anna Johnson was perhaps too cool for
the occasion. Although. "[s]ometimes there is a problem there where a
flat affect ... is presented by a witness," he said, "I don't think she

had any problems with the lawyers at all."77
The large constitutional questions of family and reproductive privacy
that occupied the trial and state supreme court in Baby M barely surfaced
in the Johnson case. Judge Parslow seemingly danced over the whole
tapestry of constitutional concerns in a sentence.7s He was sure that the
" gen�tic " mother, and not the "carrying person," has whatever procrea
_
tive nghts the Supreme Court has established as fundamenta1.79 It is far
from clear that he was right about this. After aJI, in this context, the
surrogate undergoes the greatest physical burdens of procreation�m
bryo transplant and pregnancy. Moreover,the thrust of the fundamental
privacy rights established in Roe v. Wade would seem to be that a range
of contractual _ limitatio1_1s on pr�gnancy termination and prenatal conduct
would be vmd, notwithstandmg the procreative interests of infertile
couples.80 The �xt�nsive literature in the field makes plain that these
matters of constitutionally protected rights are much more complicated
_
than even the questions
suggested in light of Roe v. Wade.s'
72. Transc�pt, supra note 5, at 11. See also Genetic Parents,
supra note 31.
Transcnpt, supra note 5, at 12-13.

73.
74.
75.
76.

/d. at 13.
/d.
Id.
77. ld.
78. Transcri�t, supra note 5, at 15 ("I think, probabl
y, as I see it, there
.

��;:���·��al problems with trying to outlaw them [i.e., surrogacy agreements)someall
are

r

79. ld. at 15-16.
80. Court enforcement of any abortion
or other prenatal conduct constraints which
.
ti

� ���ra��� sum?gacy
contr�ct� appear to be in tension with �e
.
·

f;�ri:�f��

1 c

prohi bJts state dmun ution of the right
'
to procreabve
.
choice in the a bsence of a compelling
state interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).

81. See, e.g., Richard Posner The
Eth ICS
'
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The judge was more attentive when stating recommendations for
state law. Judge Parslow's central recommendation was that the Cali
fornia legislature enact a surrogate gestator statute. His ruling effectively
brushed off as irrelevant California Civil Code Section 7003.82 He none
theless called for legislation clarifying the statute "given the technology
that we can have a different natural mother than the person from whom
the child emerges."83
Given his remarks about Johnson's competence and voluntary action,
the tenor of the judge's specific recommendations for legislative policy
are puzzling. Although he emphasized that Johnson acted intentionally
and intelligently, he recommended strenuous surrogate screening pro
cedures by disinterested agencies to determine "how they [potential
surrogates] feel about various aspects in these situations."84
Judge Parslow mentioned that enforcing surrogacy agreements was
a way to avoid patronizing women,85 yet several of his recommendations
appear to contradict this intent. As institutionalized support for back
sliders, he recommended a twenty-four-hour "hotline" to reinforce
surrogates' resolve to give up the children they carry.86 This recommen
dation seemed to imply that surrogates will not, on the whole, be fully
committed to their undertaking and that second thoughts about surro
gacy are a predictable "crisis" requiring intervention measures. Further,
he recommended a requirement that only women unable to bear children
for "medical" reasons be permitted to employ surrogates. No vanity
uses of surrogacy would be allowed. Finally, Judge Parslow recom
mended a legal requirement that surrogates be experienced natural
mothers: "I think they know what its like,they know what their feelings
Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH LAw & PoLICY 1 (1989); Walter J. W a dlington,
Baby M: Catalyst for Refomr ? , 5 J . CoNTEMP. HEALTH LAw & PoucY 1 (1989); Allen,
Privacy, Surrogacy, supra note 2; K a tharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE
L.J. 293 (1988); James Flaherty, Enforcement of Surrogate Mother Contracts: Case l.Jrw,
the Uniform Acts and State and Federal Legislation, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 223 (1988);
Thomas W. M ayo, Medical Decision Making During a Surrogate Pregnancy, 25 Hous.
L. REv. 599 (1988); Steven Miller, Surrogate Parenthood and Adoption Statutes: Can a
Square Peg Fit in a Round Hole?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 199 (1988); E. De M a rco, The Conflict
Between Reaso11 and Will in the Legislation of Surrogate Motherhood, 1987 AM. J. JuRIS
23 (1987); Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers,
99 HARv. L. REv. 1936, 1950 (1986); Note, Surrogate Motherhood: The Outer Limits of
Protected Conduct, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1131, 1141 (1986); Lizabeth Bitner, Womb for Rent:
A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and Regulating Surrogate Parenting Agree
ments, 90 DrcK. L. REv. 227, 236-37 (1985); Barbara Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose
Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 256 (1985); Note, Developing a Concept of the
Modern "Family": A Proposed UnifomJ Surrogate Parenthood :4ct, 7� GEo. L.J. 1283,
1284 n.5 (1985); George Smith and Roberto lraola, Sexualrty, PriVacy and the New
_
_
Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 263, 285 (1984); John A. Robertson, Procreahve Lrberty and
the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 420 (1983);
_
Phyllis Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestwns for
.

82.
83.
84.

85.

86.

Solutions, SO TENN. L. REv. 71, 82 (1982). See generally MARTHA FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD (1988).
See CALIF. CIVIL CoDE § 7003, supra note 33. The statute defines birth mothers as
natural, legal parents.
Transcript, supra note 5, at 18.
ld. at 16-17.
ld. at 15.
!d. at 19.
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The baby boy Anna Johnson carried in her womb � nd delivered was
awarded categorically to the Calverts. The court derued the request of
Johnson's attorney for a continuation of visita�on rights ,Pe.nding aJr
peal.BB His reason was simple. At the age of ftve weeks thmgs [such
as bonding] are happening psychologically."� To Anna Johnson th�
court awarded a philosophy of self-blame attributed to the Greek p�
losopher Democritus: "Everywhere man blames nature and f� te, yet his
_
fate is mostly but the echo of his character and pass1ons, hts mlStakes
and weaknesses. "90

Her

fate too.

III.

BEYOND ANNA'S STORY

A.

Rejecting Intent Rule

What norms should govern modern procreative arrangements and
parental status? In a recent article Professor Marjorie Shultz defended
a principle of intent as the optimal norm.91 She urged that the inevitable
disputes that arise in the context of collaborative procreation made in·
creasingly possible through new reproductive technologies should be
resolved, in the first instance, by reference to the intentions of the
parties. The standard of intent presumably respects the autonomous
plans and expectations created through voluntary exchanges. It assumes
women's competence. It avoids judicial paternalism by giving effect to
women's efforts to make choices concerning the use of their reproductive
capacities. It assures men secure, responsible roles in procreation. The
norm of intent entails legal respect for individual autonomy, including
female autonomy, and legal minimalization of the impact of knowing or
purposeful harm. 92 Yet the norm of intent is problematic. It is incon·
sistently applied and it is based on an assumption of greater equality of
opportunity than actually exists.
On the surface, the standard of intent appears morally well-founded.
Its "morality" j ustifies the pain it causes those who change their minds
and renege on prio� agre ments. Courts that enforce surrogacy agree·
�
ments of the sort at Issue m Baby M and Johnson inflict pain on the losing
.
surrogate. A losmg surrogate not only suffers grievous emotional loss,
but she must also confront a fate she once chose in ignorance of its true
character but no longer chooses. From the point of view embrace when
d
the standard of intent is accepted, the evils that the losing surrogate
ld.
See Custody Battle, supra note 16.
Transcript, supra note 5, at 24.
/d.
Marjorie Shul tz, R eproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity
_
r Gender Neutralrty,
1990 Wis. L . REv. 2 9 7, 302 (1990) [herein
after Reprod udiut
1 echnology and Intent-Based Parenthood]
.
92. Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note
9 1.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

�
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suffers are not evils a t all; they are voluntary choice . Or, if they are
evils, they are justly imposed.
One problem with the standard of intent is that it is ,md would be
inconsistently applied. Already it is not applied across the board in
cases involving non-traditional parenting arrangements, such as homoexual relationships.93 Moreover, if courts can j ustify enforcing surro
gacy contracts by appeal to intent, they can, by the same token, j ustify
enforcing betrothals, marital vows and other per onal undertakings.
Yet, the latter contracts are no longer enforced. I believe su rrogacy
arrangements should be treated in the same manner as other personal
agreements, that is, as unenforceable commitments, rather than as en
forceable commercial contracts.94 In those instances where custody bat
tles arise out of failed surrogacy agreements, courts should be ready to
intervene in the "best interest of the child," just a they currently inter
vene when custody battles arise out of failed marriages or love a ffairs.
In practice, the "best interest of the child" interventions might still
turn out to favor genetic parents more often than gestators. But the
explicit reason would not be the backward-looking reason that parties
once intended that result. It would be the forward-looking reason that
the court is persuaded of the genetic parents' superior abilities to provide
a home for the child. Conceivably, genetic parents would always win
under a "best interest of the child" analysis when they were white and
more affluent than the child's minority gestator.
Another problem with the standard of intent is that it presupposes
a backdrop of greater equality of opportunity than presently exists.
Ceteris paribus, a woman with practical nursing skills has more oppor
tunity and a wider foundation for self-determination than a woman
without skills and no high school diploma. Yet, opportunity is a matter
of degree. The United States has a recent history of legally enforced
race and gender inequality. Economic and social pressures over which
individuals have little control significantly d ictate their "voluntary"
choices. A 1989 study showed that 43.2% of all Black women with
children under the age of eighteen i n the United States lived below the
.
poverty leveJ .95 Habitually low social expectations concerning appropn
ate vocations for white women and certain minority groups limit the
horizons of individuals in these groups faced with "free" choices. More
over, some forms of liberty and contractual voluntarism impinge upon
other, equally importan t values. If liberty must be tempered by fairness,
equality and dignity, it is doubtful that the standard of intent can do all
.
of the normative work that must be done i n the wide field of procreative
arrangements and parental status.

9J. In a recent case mvolving a Jesb1an couple who had intentionally uhlized artificial

inscminallon to become the parents of two ch1ldren, the court refused to �ndorse
.
either woman's proposed ch1ld-custody plan, and demed parental and viSitation
.
See
1rrelevant.
parent!>
b1an
lc
the
of
nght . The court deemed the mtenbon
Lt$bum Is Demed Custody After Breakup, N Y Time , Mar. 24, 1991, at 22, col . 1 .
94 . Stt Allen, Surrogacy, S/JJvery, supra note 3, a t 147. ("Surrogacy arrangements ?re
be t v1ewed as unenforcable personal comm1tments or vow bctwei!n unmamed
ind1v1dual . " ). Cf. Allen, Pnvacy, Surrogacy and the Baby M Ca'-", supra note 2
(accord).
95. Stt U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Stattc;bc , upra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Minority women increasingly will be sought to serve as "mother
machines" for embryos of middle and upper-class clients. It's a
new, virulent form of racial and class discrimination. Within a
decade, thousan ds of poor and minority women will likely be
used as a "breeder class" for those who can afford $30,000 to
$40,000 to avoid the inconvenience and danger of pregnancy.97

It has been said many times before, but it bears repeating: tolerating
practices that convert women's wombs and children into valuable .market
commodities threatens to deny them respect as equals. Commercial
surrogacy encourages society to think of economically and socially vul
nerable women as at its disposal for a price. Segments of the public will
draw the obvious parallels to slavery and prostitution.98 Their reaction
may seem melodramatic. But it is a telling reminder of soda! attitudes
and history. Genetic heritage, while a factor, should not be dispositive
in a battle between genetic and gestational parents. The experience of
pregancy and childbirth, like the knowledge of genetic linkage, can play
an important role in shaping women's sense of themselves and their
responsibilities.
I believe that policymakers should discourage surrogacy, chiefly by
(1) refusing to legally enforce commercial surrogacy agreements;
(2) ascribing to surrogates parental rights that they may voluntarily
relinquish only after the birth of a child they are paid to carry;99 and by
(3) m�g no distinction between genetic and gestational surrogates
when 1t co�es to the assignment of parental rights. Legislatio n shaped
around pomts (1) and (3) would increase the risks of entering into
surrogacy arrangements for the economically more powerful parties (the
consumers and brokers of surrogacy) and decrease the risk of surrogacy
arrangements for the less economically powerful (the surrogates).
Black gestators would remain vulnerable to emotional devastation
�ven if surrogacy policies were in line with points (1), (2) and (3), and
if race were not a factor for the court in awarding child custody under
the "best int�rest" standard. A Black gestator who wanted to keep her
wh1_ �e of�sprmg, as Anna Johnson did, would likely be pressured by
farruly, friends, and experts to do otherwise. She would know that racism
96. Walker, supra, note 6.
97. Rifkin & Kimbrell, supra note 12.

� aum, Le_tter to the Editor, The San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 6, 1990, § A, at
(" I ve got JUSt one question concerning the Anna Johnson surrogate mother

98. Ruth
20.

case: If a woman can legaJJy rent her uterus
for nine months' why should the law
prevent h� r from renting her vagina
for an hour or two? . . . [Prostitution and
surrogacy mvolve] · · commercial use
of one's body for someone else's convenience
or pl easure. )
See Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, supra note 2 .
·

99.

"
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could add special stresses on individual members of her multiracial
family, leading to acrimony and rejection. t oo
Limitations on the alienability of parental rights, point (2) above, can
greatly benefit some surrogate mothers. Inalienable post-delivery pa
rental rights as limitations on surrogacy would clearly benefit white
surrogates who, like Mary Beth Whitehead Gould, want to keep their
genetically-related children. The benefit of point (2) to gestational sur
rogates, especially Black gestational surrogates, is less clear. First, ge
netic ties have special meaning in American culture. In deciding child
custody under the "best interest of the child" standard, I predict courts
would be reluctant to award children to gestational, as opposed to
similarly situated genetic, parents. Second, since genetic parents will
probably be better educated and more affluent than gestational surro
gates, courts are likely to view them as better equipped to provide good
homes. Third, most consumers of surrogacy are whites who want white
children. Although Black women's infertility and sterility rate is higher
than white women's, 101 few Black women utilize surrogate mothers.102
It follows that most Blacks who are surrogates will be surrogate gestators
for whites. The children born to Black gestational surrogates will be of
another race. Racial difference between mother and child may incline
courts against awarding custody to the Black surrogate gestator.
The number of Black gestators who could master their rational fears
and overcome judicial resistance to go with their hearts would likely be
small compared to the number who, with tragic emotional consequences,
would feel compelled to give up their offspring. We can only imagine
what Anna Johnson's life would have been like had she prevailed in her
custody bid. Perhaps her own bi-racial heritage steeled her for the
battles she would have faced as head of a multiracial family. Her will
ingness to fight to parent her gestational child was virtually as remark
able as the biotechnology that made it possible. Like Polly, the slave
who sued for her own freedom and then for the right to own her own
child, Anna Johnson was exceptionally courageous.
CONCLUSION
According to my analysis, few Black surrogates who desire to keep
their gestational children could easily decide to do so. Surrogacy laws,
even surrogacy laws that equally favor genetic and gestational surrogates
over genetic parents, offer Black gestational surrogates little protection.
As an ironic consequence, Black gestators could be the safest surrogate
mothers for white women who want white children. 103 In light of these
inequities, the Johnson case may force the conclusion on behalf of Black
women that a per se ban on commercial surrogacy is the safest-the
wisest--course.
For example, a Black gestator could foresee that her multiracial family could attract
curiosity and prejudice.
.
101. Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women m
REPRODUCTlVE LAWS FOR THE 1990's 23 (N. Taub & S. Cohen eds. 1989).
100.

102. ld.
103. Cf.

California Surrogacy Case Raises New Questions About Parenth�, s�pra note .45
(potential for racial discrimination since "couple may be more mchned to htre
minority woman to carry the child, either for financial or other reasons").

